International construction arbitration: a need for decoding the black box of decision making by Besaiso, Haytham et al.
Bes aiso,  H ay t h a m,  Fe n n,  Pe t e r  a n d  E m sley,  M a r g a r e t  (201 7)  
In t e r n a tion al  cons t r uc tion  a r bi t r a tion:  a  n e e d  for  d ecodin g  t h e  
bl ack  box  of  d e cision  m a king.  In t e r n a t ion al  Cons t r u c tion  Law  
Review, 3 4  (3). p p.  2 8 8-3 0 8.  
Downloa d e d  fro m: h t t p://insig h t .c u m b ri a. ac.uk/id/e p rin t/5 1 8 2/
U s a g e  o f  a n y  i t e m s  fr o m  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C u m b r i a’ s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e p o s i t o r y  
‘In s i g h t’  m u s t  c o nf o r m  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f a i r  u s a g e  g u i d e l i n e s .
Any  ite m  a n d  its  a s socia t e d  m e t a d a t a  h eld  in  t h e  U nive rsi ty  of  Cu m b ria ’s in s ti t u tion al  
r e posi to ry  Insig h t  (unles s  s t a t e d  o th e r wis e  on  t h e  m e t a d a t a  r e co r d)  m ay  b e  copied,  
di spl aye d  o r  p e rfo r m e d,  a n d  s to r e d  in  line  wit h  t h e  JISC  fair  d e aling  g uid eline s  (available  
h e r e ) for  e d u c a tion al a n d  no t-for-p r ofit  a c tivitie s
pr ovid e d  t h a t
•  t h e  a u t h o r s ,  ti tl e  a n d  full bibliog r a p hic  d e t ails  of t h e  it e m  a r e  ci t e d  cle a rly w h e n  a ny  
p a r t
of t h e  wo rk  is r ef e r r e d  to  ve r b ally o r  in  t h e  w ri t t e n  for m  
•  a  hyp e rlink/URL  to  t h e  o rigin al  Insig h t  r e co r d  of  t h a t  it e m  is  inclu d e d  in  a ny  
ci t a tions  of t h e  wo rk
•  t h e  co n t e n t  is  no t  c h a n g e d  in a ny  w ay
•  all file s  r e q ui r e d  for  u s a g e  of t h e  it e m  a r e  k ep t  tog e t h e r  wi th  t h e  m ain  it e m  file.
You m a y  n o t
•  s ell a ny  p a r t  of a n  it e m
•  r efe r  to  a ny  p a r t  of a n  it e m  witho u t  ci t a tion
•  a m e n d  a ny  it e m  o r  con t ext u alise  it  in  a  w ay  t h a t  will  imp u g n  t h e  c r e a to r ’s 
r e p u t a tion
•  r e m ov e  o r  al t e r  t h e  co pyrig h t  s t a t e m e n t  on  a n  it e m.
Th e  full policy ca n  b e  fou n d  h e r e . 
Alt e r n a tively  con t ac t  t h e  U nive r si ty  of  Cu m b ria  Re posi to ry  E di to r  by  e m ailing  
insig h t@cu m b ria. ac.uk .
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 2
0/
07
/2
01
7 
17
:0
8
© Informa UK plc. No unauthorised copying or sharing of this document is permitted
 INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION: 
A NEED FOR DECODING THE BLACK BOX OF 
DECISION MAKING 
 HAYTHAM BESAISO 
 (PhD Candidate, School of Mechanical, Aerospace, 
and Civil Engineering, University of Manchester. 
haytham.besaiso@manchester.ac.uk) 
 PETER FENN 
 (Reader, School of Mechanical, Aerospace, 
and Civil Engineering, University of Manchester. 
peter.fenn@manchester.ac.uk) 
 MARGARET EMSLEY 
 (Reader, School of Mechanical, Aerospace, 
and Civil Engineering, 
University of Manchester. 
margaret.emsley@manchester.ac.uk) 
 ABSTRACT
 This review paper is the fi rst synthesis of both theoretical literature and 
empirical research related to construction arbitration decision making. 
It reveals a lack of theoretical consensus on the underlying ideology that 
should guide arbitrators in rendering awards. It demonstrates that the 
available thin empirical research provides mixed evidence. While there 
is a reason to tentatively believe that there is a growing trend to follow 
the “legal model” in rendering arbitral awards, the results of the existing 
studies are far from conclusive and much more remains to be done. 
Therefore, this paper argues that there is a pressing need for further 
empirical research to unlock the black-box of arbitral decision making. To 
do so, this paper calls scholars to steer away from the positivistic paradigm 
and move closer to the grassroots level by endorsing more interpretivist 
qualitative research. 
 Keywords : International construction arbitration – Decision making – Legal 
reasoning – Commercial reasoning. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 The boom in international construction projects  1  and the rise of international 
construction arbitrations  2  appear to have a causal loop relationship. Large-
scale petrodollar international construction projects of the 1970s and 1980s 
in the Arab world led to a series of high-profi le arbitrations. After years of 
suspicion and mistrust, the success of these gigantic arbitrations laid the 
foundation for the acceptance of international commercial arbitration as 
an international private justice system.  3  Since then, arbitration has been 
fuelling the growth of international construction projects.  4  This growth is 
probably a result of the assurance arbitration offers for the multi-national 
construction companies that their disputes will be decided in a neutral 
forum that delivers an enforceable award. The neutrality of the forum for 
dispute resolution and the enforceability of the award make arbitration the 
fundamental and preferred dispute resolution technique for cross-border 
disputes in the construction industry.  5  
 As international construction arbitration expands, the parties have 
become more concerned about the standards arbitrators apply to decide 
on those mega construction disputes.  6  To ensure the sustainability 
and growth of international construction projects and international 
construction arbitration, it is necessary to understand how arbitrators 
decide. This understanding helps in the realisation of a justice system that 
produces predictable outcomes. Predictability of arbitration outcomes is 
fundamental to the performance of this signifi cant cross-border economic 
activity and to the survival of arbitration itself. It also assists the parties in 
contract negotiation and drafting, enables advocates to provide credible 
legal advice to make the arbitrate/no arbitrate decision, helps the parties to 
settle their disputes to the predictable outcome and maintain their business 
relationship.  7  In other words, the predictability of arbitration outcomes is 
expected to minimise the transaction cost. 
 However, this intellectual area of arbitral decision making has hitherto 
received scant attention by scholars. Access to this knowledge is blocked by 
the doctrine of confi dentiality in international commercial/construction 
arbitration; most awards are not published and hence little is known about 
 1   Venoit,  International construction law: a guide for cross-border transactions and legal disputes , (American 
Bar Association, 2009). 
 2   Sarcevic,  Essays on international commercial arbitration , (Brill, 1989). 
 3   Dezalay and Garth,  Dealing in virtue: International commercial arbitration and the construction of a 
transnational legal order (University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
 4   Venoit, [cited] above, fn 1. 
 5   Queen Mary, University of London School of International Arbitration, International Arbitration 
Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration (London, 2015). 
 6   Brekoulakis, “Systemic bias and the institution of international arbitration: a new approach to 
arbitral decision-making” (2013)  Journal of International Dispute Settlement . 
 7   Park, “The Predictability Paradox-Arbitrators and Applicable Law” (2015)  Transnational Dispute 
Management 12(6); Karton,  Culture of international arbitration and the evolution of contract law (2011), PhD 
Thesis, University of Cambridge. 
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the decisions of international arbitrators on the merits and substance of 
disputes.  8  In addition, the lack of knowledge on construction arbitration 
decision making is a result of the scarcity of empirical research. This vacuum 
has allowed random theorising, often resulting from anecdotes, to pass 
unchallenged and to become a received wisdom. There is little structured 
empirical evidence available to justify the theorems presented. 
 Therefore, this article aims to synthesise empirical literature as well as 
theoretical literature to capture the full spectrum of intellectual endeavour 
on international construction arbitration decision making. 
 This article is organised in fi ve main parts. In the fi rst part (Section 2.1), we 
synthesise the theoretical literature discussing how arbitrators “should decide”. 
In the second part (Section 2.2), we examine the literature on how arbitrators 
are “required to decide”. In the third part (Section 2.3), we critically review the 
available empirical research on construction arbitration decision making in 
order to provide some insight into how arbitrators “decide”. We also highlight 
the main attempts to collect or analyse international construction/commercial 
arbitration awards that assist our understanding on how arbitrators “decide”. 
In the fourth part (Section 3), we discuss what the commercial judgement, 
as opposed to the legal judgement, entails. In the fi fth part (Section 4), we 
conclude the review by suggesting directions for future research. 
 2. CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION DECISION-MAKING 
 “Most studies of arbitration are devoted to discussions about the applicable law or the 
various procedural rules. It seems far more important to try to analyse how and why 
arbitrators make up their minds.” – Robert Coulson, President, American Arbitration 
Association  9  
 This literature search shows that this statement still holds true. Arbitral 
decision making seems to lack a solid theoretical as well as empirical 
foundation as will be shown in this article. 
 The lack of a solid theoretical foundation, we assert, results from the 
lack of consensus within the scholastic community on the “appropriate” 
philosophy that should underpin the reasoning of arbitrators and guide 
them to the “right” solution. 
 The lack of a solid empirical foundation seems to result from the inherent 
privacy and confi dentiality of arbitration proceedings and awards. Unlike 
court judgments, the resolution of construction disputes via arbitration 
means there is a shortage of reported opinions in the form of published 
or accessible or reasoned awards in order to provide guidance on how 
 8   Karton, “International Commercial Arbitrators’ Approaches to Contractual Interpretation” (2012), 
 International Business Law Review , 383. 
 9   Coulson, “The Decision-making Process in Arbitration” (1990)  Arbitration Journal 45(3), p 1. 
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these private judges, the arbitrators, make their decisions. This makes the 
development of arbitration scholarship notoriously diffi cult and hence 
hinders consistency in arbitral decision making.  10  
 This paper is primarily a synthesis of the extant knowledge on construction 
arbitration decision making. To better analyse and evaluate the arguments 
presented, it is important to make a distinction between the available 
knowledge in accordance with epistemological foundations. We propose 
a taxonomy of arbitration decision-making scholarship that is useful in 
informing the analysis in this paper. The taxonomy of the scholarship divides 
the literature into theoretical and empirical research. The theoretical 
literature examines decisions from normative (asking how decisions ought 
to be made according to a value position) and prescriptive (asking how 
better decisions might be made) accounts. The empirical research seeks 
to provide informative, descriptive (asking how decisions are made) and 
explanatory (asking why decisions are made in a particular way) accounts. 
 2.1. How should arbitrators decide construction disputes? 
 The extant literature offers theoretical prescriptive and normative accounts 
of “how” arbitrators “ought to” decide commercial or construction disputes. 
These arguments are confl icting because the values that are proposed to guide 
the decision making can be inconsistent. The absence of a certain common 
philosophical ground is problematic for the construction parties and their 
legal advisors as it paves the way for inconsistency in and unpredictability of 
arbitral decision making. In particular, it appears that there is no consensus 
in the arbitration jurisprudence on whether arbitrators should follow the 
law while deciding on the substance of disputes. The debate on the legal vis-
à-vis commercial standards to govern the arbitral reasoning and judgement 
has been ongoing throughout centuries.  
 The traditional notion in US construction arbitration is manifested 
in the old textbook  Wright on Building Arbitrations that was published in 
1894 and then in a second edition in 1913. Wright asserted that technical 
arbitrators, not obstructed by law, are to render awards based on the 
evidence and using their own common-sense, technical knowledge, and 
commercial practice.  11  He rejected early arguments to legalise arbitration 
through appointing attorneys as arbitrators and putting emphasis on 
legal procedure. He fi ercely argued that “no class of men, probably, are 
more competent on the whole and technically to act as an arbitrator in 
the building and engineering disputes than the experienced architect, 
 10   Moloo and King, “International Arbitrators as Lawmakers” (2014)  New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 46(3); Weidemaier, “Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration” (2010) 
 William and Mary Law Review 51, 1895. 
 11   Wright,  Wright on building arbitrations; a manual for architects, students, contractors and construction 
engineers (San Francisco: Wale Printing Co, 1913). 
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contractor or engineer”. His arguments for the identity of an arbitrator 
and the philosophy for arbitration decision-making rested on the grounds 
that most questions that frequently came up before arbitration tribunals 
were not questions of law, but questions of fact. These factual controversies 
involved matters related to construction techniques, drawings, trade 
customs, value of works etc. which the technical arbitrator usually has at his 
fi ngers’ ends. Hence, the construction professional, as an arbitrator, can 
decide the normative question “What is right and proper to be done under 
certain conditions and circumstances?”. 
 A century after Wright’s book, the same debate is ongoing. The proponents 
of the “commercial model” in arbitral decision-making suggest, more or 
less candidly, that the arbitral justice as a private justice system is different 
from the court justice as a national justice system. Arbitral justice is closer 
to commerce.  12  As such, they consider that the “commercial reasoning” 
employed by arbitrators is superior to “private law reasoning” employed 
by courts. The rationale is that the former is concerned with the parties’ 
expectations that are grounded in their business relationships while the latter 
is concerned with the letter of the law that is entrenched in a parochial legal 
analysis.  13  The arbitrators’ concern to deliver an award that will be considered 
fair and just in a particular business community make them seek a “business 
interpretation”. To do so, when framing a legal solution, arbitrators are 
more inclined to acknowledge the commercial practice as a legitimate “legal 
source”.  14  Hermann  15  considers arbitration to be a more common-sense 
method of resolving business disputes according to commercial practice. 
He argues that parties choose arbitration because they seek an arbitrator 
knowledgeable about their business and capable to resolve disputes according 
to sound business sense rather than a literal legal analysis of the text. 
 Other scholars  16  are less subtle or probably more daring in asserting that one 
of the unique hallmarks of arbitration, whether domestic or international, is 
that arbitrators do not have to follow the law. This is because the principle 
of arbitration is to determine the facts and render a fair settlement. In order 
to do this, arbitrators have discretion to base their decisions upon technical, 
commercial or legal grounds less restricted by the applicable legal authorities. 
By the same token, a US court affi rmed that arbitrators as a general rule are 
unlearned in law and therefore “ they are expected to decide the matters in dispute 
 12   Landolt, “Arbitrators’ Initiatives to Obtain Factual and Legal Evidence” (2012)  Arbitration 
International 28(2), 173 to 224. 
 13   Collins, 1999 cited in Karton, [cited] above, fn 7. 
 14   Vogenauer, “Sources of Law and Legal Method in Comparative Law” in Mathias Reimann and 
Reinhard Zimmerman (eds),  The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 879. 
 15   Hermann,  Judges, Law and Businessmen (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983). 
 16   DiMatteo, “Soft law and the principle of fair and equitable decision making in international 
contract arbitration” (2013)  The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law ; Jannadia, Assaf, Bubshait, and 
Naji “Contractual methods for dispute avoidance and resolution” (2000)  International Journal of Project 
Management 18(1), 41 to 49; Thomson, “Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of AAA Construction 
Arbitrators” (1994)  Hofstra Law Review 23, 137. 
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according to those principles of equity and good conscience which, in their opinion, will 
do justice between the parties, untrammelled by the niceties of the law ”.  17  
 Karton  18  asserts that “many” international arbitrators consider the greater 
attention given to commercial practices over legal rules to be an important 
comparative advantage for arbitration over litigation. They consider that 
business people prefer judgments in accordance with the standards of 
their industries, and not in accordance to a set of rigid rules of contract 
law imposed upon them by a legal system. Similarly, Ossman argues,  19  
based on personal experience in US construction arbitration, that business 
people tend to prefer resolutions based on commercial norms rather than 
legal standards. Notwithstanding their preference, he states that they are 
frequently disappointed by the actual process that is contrary to their 
expectations. 
 Nonetheless, not everyone in the arbitration community considers failure 
to follow the established law as a benefi t of arbitration. Several commentators 
on international commercial arbitration  20  and US commercial arbitration  21  
consider that the arbitrators’ failure to follow the law or the terms of the 
parties’ contract to be frustrating to the parties’ expectations. The parties 
appear to prefer the application of known legal principles ensuring, to a 
certain extent, certainty and predictability of a dispute outcome if it went 
to arbitration. The certainty and predictability of a dispute outcome make 
it easier for them to quantify risks and to price their contracts  ex ante and 
assist them to negotiate a compromise once a dispute arises  ex post .  22  The 
main reason for choosing arbitration is because parties from different 
nationalities do not wish their rights and obligations to be determined by 
the courts of the other party’s state of nationality.  23  
 While apparently, the aforementioned authors speak on behalf of the 
users of arbitration, this literature search fi nds no study soliciting the actual 
preferences and expectations of the parties themselves. It is desirable to 
undertake a study to better understand the standards the parties expect 
tribunals to apply while making their decisions. 
 17   Thomson, [cited] above, fn 16. 
 18   Karton, “The Arbitral Role in Contractual Interpretation” (2015)  Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement . 
 19   Ossman III,  Consistency and Reliability of Construction Arbitration Decisions: Empirical Study , (2003) 
MSc, Pepperdine University. 
 20   See, e.g., Webster and Buhler,  Handbook of ICC arbitration: commentary, precedents, materials (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2014); Mitchell, “Must Arbitrators Follow the Law?” in  JAMS newsletter , Spring 2012. 
 21   See, e.g., Stipanowich and Lamare, “Living with ‘ADR’: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, 
Arbitration and Confl ict Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations” (2013)  Arbitration and Confl ict 
Management in Fortune 1; Stipanowich and Ulrich, “Arbitration in Evolution: Current Practices and 
Perspectives of Experienced Commercial Arbitrators” (2014)  Columbia American Review of International 
Arbitration 25; Thomson, [cited] above, fn 16. 
 22   Karton, “A Confl ict of Interests: Seeking a Way Forward on Publication of International Arbitral 
Awards” (2012)  Arbitration International 28(3), 447 to 486. 
 23   Drahozal and Naimark,  Towards a science of international arbitration: collected empirical research (Kluwer 
Law International, 2005); Dezalay and Garth, [cited] above, fn 3. 
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 2.2. How arbitrators are “required” to decide construction disputes? 
 Mitchell  24  re-examined the old-age question on whether arbitrators are 
“required” to follow the law in the context of international arbitration. He 
started his article stating: 
 “A shocking string of emails circulated within a very credible Listserv disclosed that a 
number of full-time arbitrators took the position that arbitrators need not follow the 
law in drafting awards. The author strongly disagrees.” 
 He examined international institutional arbitration rules (e.g. AAA, 
ICC, LCIA), the UNCITRAL Model Law (the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration) and the New York Convention (the 
1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards) and concluded that arbitrators are required to follow the law and 
the terms of the parties’ contract. Therefore, arbitrators should meet the 
parties’ expectations of a proper adherence to the law. This is the law the 
parties bargained for when they negotiated and entered into the contract.  25  
Likewise, Webster and Buhler  26  assert that arbitrators are expected and 
required to apply the law because, even though courts will probably not 
review the arbitrators’ interpretation of law, a failure to apply the law can 
result in the annulment of the award. 
 However, the reality is much more complex, and there is disagreement 
with this conclusion. In fact, and unlike court litigation, there is little 
opportunity to appeal or challenge an arbitral award on substantive 
grounds i.e. on the basis that the arbitral tribunal made a mistake of law. 
The arbitration statutes of many countries and most institutional arbitration 
rules, refl ecting the policy of the New York Convention and the Model Law, 
do not provide for appeal based on erroneous legal conclusions or factual 
fi ndings. The available grounds for challenge/nullifi cation/setting aside 
of awards at the place of arbitration or for non-enforcement of awards at 
the place of enforcement (the state in which enforcement is sought, which 
will be a state where the losing party has recoverable assets) are limited and 
narrow and almost entirely procedural or jurisdictional.  27  In annulment 
or recognition and enforcement proceedings, the courts’ focus is on 
procedural matters and hence judges will probably not set aside an award 
or refuse enforcement on meritorious grounds that the arbitrators made 
a wrong decision based on an error of law, or contract interpretation or 
fact.  28  For instance, in 2013, the High Court of Australia refused to overturn 
an arbitration award “due to an error of law on the face of the award”. 
 24   Mitchell, [cited] above, fn 20. 
 25   Ibid . 
 26   Webster and Buhler, [cited] above, fn 20. 
 27   Redfern and Hunter,  Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Sixth Edition), (2015); 
Kaufmann-Kohler, “The arbitrator and the law: does he/she know it? Apply it? How? And a few more 
questions” (2005)  Arbitration International 21(4), 631 to 638. 
 28   Karton, [cited] above, fn 7. 
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 2
0/
07
/2
01
7 
17
:0
8
Pt 3] International Construction Arbitration 295
© Informa UK plc. No unauthorised copying or sharing of this document is permitted
The court noted that Article 28 of the UNCITRAL Model Law does not 
require an arbitral award to be correct in law. The court also stated that 
the instructions of both the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York 
Convention are to enforce foreign arbitral awards and not to review such 
awards for errors in the application of the law.  29  In addition, the “Guide 
to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration” 
notes that, under Article 28 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, an arbitral 
tribunal is not required to apply the law chosen by the parties in a manner 
that a competent court would have applied the law.  30  This probably implies 
a more relaxed approach in applying the law which permits a deviation 
from the legal principles or accommodation of commercial considerations. 
 This state of affairs; the opposition of national arbitration laws and institu-
tional arbitration rules to appeal based on merit or substance of the case,  31  
tends to vest arbitrators with a broad and virtually unreviewable decision-
making power. Even obvious legal mistakes in arbitration awards are virtually 
immune from appellate review.  32  The absence of formal constraints on the 
arbitrators’ ability to err in fi nding the facts, determining the content of the 
law, or applying the law to the fact may pave the way for inconsistent and unpre-
dictable arbitration awards. DiMatteo  33  similarly suggests that the fl exibility of 
arbitral reasoning based on both hard law and soft law – i.e. legal arguments 
and commercial arguments – fl ows naturally from the protection and immu-
nity granted by the narrow grounds for appealing an arbitration award. 
 This disconnection between the arbitration rules requiring arbitrators 
to follow the law in rendering arbitral awards and the national arbitration 
laws, the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention providing 
no grounds for setting aside or for non-enforcement of arbitral awards in 
cases where arbitrators did not follow the law reveals a mysterious gap in 
the arbitral decision-making system. The vacuum left by the absence of a 
mechanism to ensure compliance with the requirement to apply the law in 
making decisions casts some doubt on the seriousness of this requirement or 
at least indicates a defect in the international arbitration system. This defect 
is probably a natural outcome of trying to reconcile genuinely irreconcilable 
goals; getting it right (correctness) and getting it done (fi nality). 
 2.3. How do arbitrators decide construction disputes? 
 “Much of our understanding of what happens in arbitration proceedings is based 
on anecdotal sources of information such as reported court cases, published arbitral 
 29   DiMatteo, [cited] above, fn 16. 
 30   Ibid . 
 31   Jenkins and Stebbings,  International construction arbitration law (Vol 1) (Kluwer Law International, 
2006); McConnaughay, “The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A ‘Second Look’ at International 
Commercial Arbitration” (1999)  Northwestern University Law Review 93, 453. 
 32   Rogers,  Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration (2002). 
 33   DiMatteo, [cited] above, fn.16. 
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awards, and attorney ‘war stories’. The problem with anecdotes, of course, is that it 
is diffi cult to evaluate whether the event described is typical or atypical, frequent or 
infrequent, ordinary or extreme.”  34  
 In an epistemological revolution on the longstanding paradigm in our 
knowledge of the arbitral decision-making process, few empiricists went 
beyond theoretical debate or anecdotal evidence. The empirical research 
seeks empirical evidence i.e. seeks an answer based on what arbitrators 
actually do or what arbitrators think they do. This literature review fi nds 
four empirical attempts to challenge the frontier of existing knowledge in 
the domains of domestic construction arbitration.  35  To provide a state-of-
the-art review, these studies are supplemented by two relevant empirical 
studies in international commercial arbitration.  36  
 2.3.1. Socio-legal empirical research 
 Empiricists have sought to answer whether arbitrators follow the law  37  and 
whether arbitrators render consistent and predictable awards.  38  These 
studies contribute to our empirical understanding and they are summarised 
hereunder. 
 The fi rst experimental study  39  involves a hypothetical construction delay 
dispute scenario summarised in two pages and distributed to a pool of 
construction professionals in the US, amongst which 429 responded. The 
dispute included uncontested facts, but was not an either-or, dichotomous, 
situation with short and simple facts. The respondents were asked to decide 
on liability and damages. Although facts were uncontested, the arbitrators 
rendered inconsistent awards including different apportionment of liability 
and quantifi cation of damages. 
 The second study, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators’ empirical 
study,  40  involves a hypothetical multi-claim construction dispute scenario 
distributed to fi ve distinguished arbitrators in England. The fi ve arbitrators 
reached different fi ndings of facts and conclusions of law including variant 
determinations of liability and quantifi cation of damages. 
 34   Drahozal, “Of Rabbits and Rhinoceri: A Survey of Empirical Research on International Commercial 
Arbitration” (2003)  Journal of International Arbitration 20, 23. 
 35   Stipanowich and Ulrich, [cited] above, fn 21; Ossman III, [cited] above, fn 19; Bartlett, 
“A complete and unabridged facsimile of papers as seen by the honourable and illustrious arbitrator 
in the frequently perplexing and oft-times diverting case of  Meadowsweet v Bindweed ” (2000)  Arbitration 
83–163; Thomson, [cited] above, fn 16. 
 36   Karton, “International Arbitration Culture and Global Governance” in Walter Mattli and Thomas 
Dietz (eds),  International Arbitration and Global Governance: Contending Theories and Evidence (Oxford 
University Press, 2014); Karton, [cited] above, fn 8. 
 37   Stipanowich and Ulrich, [cited] above, fn 21; Thomson, [cited] above, fn 16. 
 38   Ossman III, [cited] above, fn 19; Bartlett, [cited] above, fn 35. 
 39   Ossman III, Bayraktar and Cui, “Consistency and Reliability of Construction Arbitration Decisions: 
Empirical Study” (2009)  Journal of Management in Engineering 26(2), 56 to 64. 
 40   Bartlett, [cited] above, fn 35. 
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 The third study includes a large-scale quantitative survey done by 
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in 1994 seeking empirical 
evidence as to how arbitrators think they decide.  41  The study was prompted 
by a prevailing concern amongst many users of US construction arbitration 
on the arbitrators’ non-adherence to legal standards and their tendency 
to engage in unjustifi able compromise decisions.  42  So, the study asked 
an empirical question; “Do arbitrators follow the law?” This question is 
different from the theoretical questions posed earlier in this paper; “Should 
arbitrators follow the law?” and “Are arbitrators required to follow the law?”. 
The survey fi nds that 20% of construction arbitrators do not follow the law 
in formulating arbitral awards while 72% of construction arbitrators do. If 
arbitrators have no obligation to follow the substantive law when rendering 
an award, then they are not necessarily bound to follow the terms of the 
parties’ contract as the law might normally require. In this regard, the 
survey fi nds that 25% of construction arbitrators do not enforce the parties’ 
contract according to its terms in formulating arbitral awards while 67% of 
construction arbitrators apply it. In this case, what is the point of having the 
contract at the fi rst place? The “formalist” arbitrators who mechanistically 
enforce the contract consider this as part of their obligation. The “realist” 
arbitrators argue that contracts are often incomplete, silent on the matters 
of the dispute, ambiguous or unfair and hence would lead to an inequitable 
outcome.  43  Although arbitration is one of the preferred dispute resolution 
techniques, the study concludes that arbitration users are discontented 
with arbitration that is not only expensive and lengthy but also producing 
awards not based on facts, contract and law. In this case, what good is it to 
opt for arbitration when it is not only more expensive and time-consuming 
but also more uncertain and unpredictable than recourse to litigation? The 
fi nding that some arbitrators do not follow the law or the parties’ contract 
in rendering their awards is alarming. When the contract or the arbitration 
agreement specifi es the substantive law applicable to the dispute, the 
arbitrators would be exceeding their authority if they rendered an award 
to the contrary. The paradox here is that appeal, whether domestically or 
internationally, is generally possible on the grounds of arbitrators exceeding 
their authority ( ultra petita ) but not on the grounds of a substantive error as 
a result of ignoring the contract or law.  44  
 In addition to this study, recent empirical studies  45  on US commercial 
arbitration indicate that the same users’ concerns, that will ultimately be 
a barrier to arbitration use, still linger. The main concerns still revolve 
 41   Thomson, [cited] above, fn 16. 
 42   Stipanowich, “Preliminary Analysis of Responses to the Questionnaire on Construction Industry 
Arbitration” (1987)  The Construction Lawyer 7, 17. 
 43   Thomson, [cited] above, fn 16. 
 44   da Silveira and Lévy, “Transgression of the Arbitrators’ Authority: Article V(1)(C) of the New York 
Convention” in Gaillard, E & Di Pietro, D (eds)  Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International 
Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention 1958 in Practice (Cameron May, 2007). 
 45   Stipanowich and Lamare, [cited] above, fn 21; Stipanowich and Ulrich, [cited] above, fn 21. 
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around the possibility that arbitrators will not follow the applicable legal 
standards in rendering awards, the perceived tendency of arbitrators to 
indulge in inappropriate compromises in award-making, and the diffi culty 
of successfully appealing arbitration awards based on those two concerns. 
 However, it is unclear to what extent these concerns are relics of past 
decades, when the environment of construction arbitration was different. At 
the present day, the environment of construction arbitration has changed 
since the AAA’s 1994 survey and much changed since Wright’s books of 
1891 and 1913. One key change relates to the confi guration of construction 
arbitration tribunals. Construction professionals or multidisciplinary panels 
have long been used in the arbitration of construction disputes in the US. 
The recent evidence  46  suggests that these panels are diminishing as there 
is increasing emphasis on appointing arbitrators with legal backgrounds 
instead of construction professional arbitrators. The construction arbitration 
“drift” towards a litigation model fl ows from the increasing intrusion by 
legal professionals sitting in the tribunal or representing the parties. In 
turn, this change will probably transform the landscape of construction 
arbitral decision making, as the applicable standards might be different. 
 In order to assess the extent to which these concerns are justifi ed, 
Pepperdine’s Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution in cooperation with 
the College of Commercial Arbitrators (CCA) undertook a recent survey 
on Arbitration Practice in 2013.  47  The survey targeted the most experienced 
arbitrators in the US who have arbitrated domestic and international 
disputes. However, the survey questions made no distinction between 
domestic and international arbitration. Almost half of the respondents 
arbitrated construction cases. The survey responses indicate, contrary to 
the users’ perceptions and concerns, that nearly all of the experienced 
arbitrators tend to be meticulous in paying heed to legal arguments 
and that they do whatever they can to ascertain and follow the law in 
rendering an award. The greater consideration given to legal authority in 
arbitral decision making could be explained by the legal background and 
orientation of the respondents as all of them claimed a legal or judicial 
background.  48  By analogy, as the change in the position of legal standards 
in decision making between the two surveys  49  could be attributed to the 
background of respondents/arbitrators, the same probably applies to real-
life. In other words, the increased emphasis on appointing arbitrators with 
legal backgrounds and the commensurate de-emphasis on appointing 
arbitrators with construction backgrounds will probably elevate the status 
of legal standards in construction arbitral decision-making. 
 46   Stipanowich, “Managing Construction Confl ict: Unfi nished Revolution, Continuing Evolution” 
(2014)  The Construction Lawyer 34; Stipanowich and Ulrich, [cited] above, fn 21. 
 47   Stipanowich and Ulrich, [cited] above, fn 21. 
 48   Ibid . 
 49   Thomson, [cited] above, fn 16; Stipanowich and Ulrich, [cited] above, fn 21. 
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 However, the responses on the survey also add a puzzling caveat which 
does not provide a defi nitive answer to this question. A quarter of the 
respondents said that at least “sometimes” they feel “free to follow their own 
sense of equity and fairness in rendering an award even if the result would 
be contrary to applicable law”.  50  This statement blurs our understanding for 
two reasons. First, the semantic ambiguity inherent in words such as “some-
times” makes it uncertain in meaning. It has different meanings to different 
individuals. People have different interpretations of the same numeric fre-
quency depending on the context and the general expectation connected 
with the phenomenon.  51  Second, it remains unclear how those arbitrators 
interpret their mandate or conceptualise their role. In some situations arbi-
trators may believe that to achieve fairness they are left with no choice but to 
refuse to apply the law. The arbitrators’ choice to ignore the law in favour of 
their own brand of personal justice combined with the broad leeway given 
by courts to arbitral awards may be problematic because this may be con-
trary to the parties’ expectations. Therefore, the fact that arbitral awards are 
almost entirely immune to annulment on substantive grounds should not be 
exploited by arbitrators to bring their own brand of personal justice. From 
here, arbitrators should be mindful of their “ethical obligation” to ensure 
that they are acting in accordance with the parties’ expectations.  52  This 
argument proposes that the benchmark for measuring the effectiveness of 
arbitral award should be the parties’ expectations, whether grounded in the 
legal model or the commercial model or something else. In other words, 
there is no universal “right” approach to render arbitral awards. It depends 
on the parties’ choices, thus refl ecting the principle of “party autonomy”. 
 The previous studies examine the construction/commercial arbitral 
decision making in the domestic contexts of the UK and the US. 
Unfortunately, this literature search fi nds no empirical study attempting 
to explore international construction arbitration decision-making. Hence, 
to supplement this shortage, we borrow the relevant empirical research 
on domestic construction arbitration decision-making and international 
commercial arbitration decision-making. 
 Therefore, readers who want to assess the transferability of the fi ndings 
of these empirical studies need to be mindful of the possible contextual 
variations. For instance, the environment of the international construction/
commercial arbitration seems to be dominated by the legal profession. The 
arbitrators tend to be law professors, senior barristers, Queen’s Counsels, 
senior partners in law fi rms or retired judges.  53  Second, the available 
evidence suggests that the construction parties do not go for international 
 50   Stipanowich, [cited] above, fn 46. 
 51   Bühring-Uhle, Drahozal and Naimark,  A survey on arbitration and settlement in international business 
disputes (Kluwer Law International, the Hague, 2005). 
 52   Stipanowich, [cited] above, fn 46. 
 53   Dezalay and Garth, [cited] above, fn 3. 
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arbitration to avoid legal determinations for their disputes. Rather, they 
are keen to get their disputes decided on legal grounds. The main reason 
for choosing international arbitration is because the parties from different 
nationalities do not wish their rights and obligations to be determined by 
the courts of the other party’s state of nationality.  54  
 Hence, the application of the law and other standards in decision making 
could have a more serious treatment in international arbitration than in 
domestic arbitration. The following section discusses the fi ndings of the 
main study,  55  that this literature search identifi es as relevant, which examines 
how international commercial arbitrators decide and whether they follow 
the law in the interpretation of contracts. 
 2.3.2. Doctrinal Analysis of Published Awards 
 The publication of arbitral awards would permit insight into the secretive 
and mysterious process of arbitral decision making. However, unfortunately, 
the arbitration system fails in bringing to light the arbitrators’ decisions. 
Unlike construction litigation case-law supplied by national courts that is 
available and accessible, construction arbitration awards are often neither 
published nor accessible.  56  The current established arbitral regime prevents 
to a large extent the publication of arbitral awards because of the doctrine 
of confi dentiality of arbitration. The proportion of published international 
commercial arbitral awards remains tremendously small but even those 
awards that manage to “see the light” are only available in extract or 
sanitised form most of the time.  57  This restricts the doctrinal research that 
is characterised by the study of legal texts or, in this context, arbitration 
awards, in order to reveal the rules and principles that govern the decision 
making on the merits of the case, or at least used to justify the awards. 
 Despite this black-box policy, this literature search identifi es three sources 
for international construction arbitral awards. Two eminent scholars, 
Christopher Seppälä  58  and Mohi-Eldin Alam-Eldin  59  managed to collect and 
publish a number of international construction arbitration awards. The four 
 54   Ibid . 
 55   Karton, [cited] above, fn 36. 
 56   Karton, [cited] above, fn 22; Weidemaier, [cited] above, fn 10. 
 57   Moloo and King, [cited] above, fn 10. 
 58   Christopher Seppälä (1998; 2008; 2012; 2013): “International Construction Contract Disputes: 
Commentary on ICC Awards Dealing with the FIDIC International Conditions of Contract”  ICC International 
Court of Arbitration Bulletin – Vol 9/No 2 (1998); “International Construction Contract Disputes: Second 
Commentary on ICC Awards Dealing Primarily with FIDIC Contracts”  ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin – Vol 19/No 2 (2008); “International Construction Contract Disputes: Third Commentary on ICC 
Awards Dealing Primarily with FIDIC Contracts”  ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin – Vol 23/No 
2 (2012); “International Construction Contract Disputes: Fourth Commentary on ICC Awards Dealing 
Primarily with FIDIC Contracts”  ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin – Vol 24/No 2 (2013). 
 59   Mohi-Eldin Alam-Eldin (2000; 2003; 2010; 2014): Alam Eldin,  Arbitral Awards of the Cairo Regional 
Centre for International Commercial Arbitration I (Kluwer Law International, 2000); Alam Eldin,  Arbitral 
Awards of the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration II (Kluwer Law International, 
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publications of Seppälä examine ICC construction arbitral awards dealing 
primarily with FIDIC contracts. The four books of Alam-Eldin include a 
collection of international construction arbitral awards rendered under 
the auspices of CRCICA. The third source is the International Council for 
Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (1976 – 
to date) published by Kluwer Law International. In spite of the insight 
these cases offer in light of the paucity of empirical evidence, they are short 
excerpts in most instances and they cover both procedural decisions and 
substantive decisions. The substantive part is primarily a re-telling of the 
facts of the dispute and the reasoned awards, with a minor commentary by 
the editors. The analysis of these international construction arbitral awards 
can probably be suitable for future research and publication. 
 One of the few studies that aims to provide evidence on what arbitrators 
actually do is that of Karton.  60  Given the small sample size of the examined 
arbitration cases, Karton provides tentative conclusions on the arbitrators’ 
treatment of customs and usages as well as the arbitrators’ approach in 
contractual interpretation. 
 Although, like almost all other scholars, Karton  61  has not defi ned 
“commercial judgement”, he suggests that its main practical manifestation 
is rooted in the privileged status the arbitrators give to arguments based 
on business customs, trade usage, and commercial practice to render fair 
and reasonable awards. He supported his argument by evidence from 
ICC arbitration cases. He fi nds that arbitrators may unilaterally invoke 
general principles of international commercial practice and business 
norms to govern the parties’ rights and obligations even if the parties have 
neither raised them nor are actually aware of them. For instance, they may 
apply these customs and usages to interpret terms of the contract and to 
examine their “commercial reasonableness”. In other words, they apply a 
commercial reasonableness test to examine if the terms are consistent with 
the prevailing commercial practice in order to survive (e.g. ICC Case No 
9443 where the tribunal disregarded the literal plain meaning of the term 
the parties agreed to and applied the customary practice). Further, what 
sounds to be unthinkable for the commercial parties is that arbitrators may 
also use trade usages to override an express term in the contract or to take 
precedence over a legal provision in the code or precedents (e.g. ICC Case 
No 7063, ICC Case No 3820). One of the forms of invoking trade usages is by 
applying lex mercatoria. There is evidence that, sometimes, arbitrators may 
unilaterally apply these principles even if the parties have not authorised 
2003); Alam Eldin,  Construction Arbitral Awards Rendered Under the Auspices of CRCICA (Lambert Academic 
Publishing, 2010); Alam Eldin,  Arbitral Awards of the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial 
Arbitration IV (Kluwer Law International, 2014). 
 60   Karton, [cited] above, fn 8. 
 61   Karton, [cited] above, fn 36. 
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them to do so and even if they objected to its application (e.g. ICC Case No 
8873 of 1997).  62  
 The disregard of law and overriding its provisions by the usage and custom 
will probably be contrary to the judiciary practice in applying the law. The 
disregard of express terms in the contract and replacing them with the 
usage and custom defeats the principle of  pacta sunt servanda (freedom of 
contract). Probably, those arbitrators assume that the parties had intended 
to be bound by the industry’s norms and commercial practice. Therefore, 
they tend to open the door for contextual evidence (including evidence 
on prevailing customs and usages) and follow a subjective interpretation of 
the contract regardless of the express terms of the contract. This piece of 
the puzzle leads us to the need to understand the arbitrators’ approach in 
contract interpretation. 
 Karton  63  analysed 53 international commercial arbitration awards to 
examine the international arbitrators’ approach in contract interpretation 
and whether they follow the interpretive methods dictated by the governing 
law or follow the interpretive methods they prefer. Karton fi nds that there is 
a civil law bias in contract interpretation. In other words, the international 
arbitrators tend to interpret the contract in a subjective way to determine 
the true subjective common intention of the parties by admitting extrinsic 
evidence. In some cases, where the law governing the contract interpretation 
and performance is that of a common law jurisdiction that seeks objective 
interpretation, the tribunal admitted some extrinsic evidence of the parties’ 
subjective intent. Hence, in general, international arbitrators are likely to 
consider all materials that may help to reveal the subjective understandings of 
the parties, even if the substantive law is that of a common law jurisdiction.  64  
This is different from the way judges would act and is probably a failure to 
apply the law in the correct manner i.e. similar to the national courts. 
 To supplement and corroborate his fi ndings from these cases, Karton 
interviewed 20 international commercial arbitrators to understand their 
approach in contractual interpretation. He fi nds that a “commercial 
mentality exists alongside a legal mentality in the minds of arbitrators” and 
that they would try, if at all possible, to bring commercial reasoning to the 
decision making toolbox. One international arbitrator refl ects this mind-
set by affi rming that contractual interpretation has only two rules; common 
sense and commercial sense. Karton’s fi ndings are compatible with a 
statement made by Derains: “ The interpretation of contracts is one of the areas 
in which international commercial arbitrators are most inclined to disengage from 
national laws in order to resort to general principles of law .”  65  In the same vein, 
 62   Ibid . 
 63   Ibid . 
 64   Ibid . 
 65   Karton, [cited] above fn 8. 
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Webster and Buhler  66  state that arbitrators, in some awards, appear to avoid 
relying on the principles of interpretation set out in the substantive law. They 
criticised this approach in the interpretation of contract provisions as they 
cannot be interpreted in a legal vacuum; they may have special meanings 
according to the applicable law. In contrast, DiMatteo  67  argues that the 
optimal approach in contract interpretation in international commercial 
arbitration is “contextualism” because contextual evidence (customs, trade 
usage, practice, prior dealings) helps arbitrators to understand the nature 
of the transaction, to ascertain the parties intent and to examine whether a 
party acted in good faith. 
 Hence, the available evidence suggests that at least some arbitrators 
tend to prefer a commercial construction of a contract, a subjective 
interpretation of a contract, and contextual evidence on the parties intent 
drawn from trade usages and customs. Why do arbitrators do so and what is 
the link between those concepts? To understand how arbitrators decide, it 
is necessary to understand the ultimate goal that guides them. 
 DiMatteo  68  argues that the primary goal of most commercial arbitrators is 
to render fair and just decisions. To achieve this, it is imperative to achieve 
a commercially reasonable construction of a contract (interpretation of 
meaning, fi lling a gap or implying a term into the contract). To construct such 
a “hypothetical contract”, the arbitrators need to ascertain the “hypothetical 
intent” of a “hypothetical entity” called a “reasonable commercial person”. 
As a benchmark guiding the arbitrators, this commercial person has the 
background commercial knowledge (informed by customs and usages etc.), 
which would reasonably have been available to the parties, at the time of 
the contract. The understanding of this person should be the same as the 
understanding of the parties, and hence they should have formed the same 
intent. This is the intent that should govern the contractual interpretation 
as it is likely to give effect to the true intention of the parties who act in good 
faith.  69  
 3. THE COMMERCIAL MODEL OF ARBITRAL JUDGEMENT: 
WHAT IS IT ALL ABOUT? 
 This literature review demonstrates the lack of consensus on the fundamental 
basis of the arbitral decision making. The division is between two schools 
of thoughts; the commercial school and the legal school. Both sides assert 
that they meet the parties’ expectation; an assertion that this review fi nds 
no empirical evidence to support. The proponents of the legal model assert 
 66   Webster and Buhler, [cited] above, fn 20. 
 67   DiMatteo, [cited] above fn 16. 
 68   Ibid . 
 69   Ibid . 
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that the parties expect arbitrators to adhere to the law because this is an 
assurance for predictability of dispute outcome and hence stability in the 
commercial and business dealings. Further, they argue that this is what 
the arbitrators are instructed to do in the arbitration rules and statues. On 
the other hand, the proponents of the commercial model assert that the 
parties expect the arbitrators to be more attentive to the commercial practice 
and to follow their business common-sense. In this respect, it is worthwhile 
to understand what all that commercial judgement or commercial reasoning 
actually mean. 
 It is surprising that almost all scholars arguing for or against this 
concept do so without trying to defi ne it. However, the literature provides 
implicit and probably imprecise notion of what this concept entails. Some 
scholars implicitly linked the concept of commercial reasonableness to 
the commercial practice, industry’s norms, trade usages and customs. As 
the role of law in international commercial arbitration is still a matter of 
controversy, the scholars have reached no consensus on the role of usages 
and customs. 
 As a starting point, the very existence of the notion of  lex mercatoria 
(uncodifi ed general principles of international commerce) indicates a 
long-lasting consensus between the arbitrators and merchants or business 
people on the primacy of usages and customs in the arbitration of disputes. 
 In addition, the stance adopted by the international institutional 
arbitration rules and national arbitration laws is partly a manifestation 
of arbitrators’ preference to apply the customs.  70  Most international 
arbitration rules and national arbitration laws require that arbitrators shall 
take into account the relevant trade usages, along with the substantive 
rules applicable to the merits of the dispute.  71  Based on this requirement, 
Drahozal reached impressionistic conclusion that arbitrators “in fact” do 
rely on trade usages. 
 Actually, most national laws acknowledge the role of the customs, in 
contractual interpretation or gap fi lling, but they confer them with different 
effects.  72  The civil law school deems the trade usages to be a “secondary 
sources of law” that may be taken into consideration in the determination 
of the rights and obligations of the parties. The common law school deems 
trade usages, that are known or ought to be known by the parties, to be “a 
part of the contract” i.e. incorporated to the contract under the “implied 
terms” doctrine.  73  So, what does the requirement to “take trade usages into 
account” actually mean and how can it add an extra value for the usages 
in the arbitral decision making? Does that imply arbitrators will give more 
 70   Karton, [cited] above, fn 36. 
 71   Drahozal, “Commercial norms, commercial codes, and international commercial arbitration” 
(2000)  Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 33, 79. 
 72   Ayo lu, “Application of Trade Usages in International Institutional Arbitration–Some Refl ections” 
(2012)  ASA Bulletin 30(3), 539 to 547. 
 73   Ibid . 
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weight to arguments based on customary commercial practice by reshuffl ing 
the hierarchies of authorities and placing it above the legal rule? In other 
words, will arbitrators give greater weight to commercial arguments than 
legal arguments? Does that mean the parties are deemed to incorporate 
these usages into their contract, notwithstanding the effect conferred to 
them by the applicable law? 
 There is an opinion that the express requirement by arbitration laws 
and arbitration rules to consider trade usages probably confers on them 
a more signifi cant role compared to that available under national legal 
systems.  74  Hence, customs and usages of the particular trade or industry or 
any international instrument relevant to the dispute should be given more 
weight than and be applied in preference to the rules of national law.  75  
Webster and Buhler  76  assert that Article 21(2) of the 2012 ICC Rules appears 
to place “trade usages” on the same level as the contract. This is because the 
parties’ agreement on this article means that relevant trade usages have 
become part of their contract by incorporation of the rules. Nevertheless, 
they maintain that the available evidence, obtained from parties’ pleadings 
and awards reasons, indicates that arbitrators tend to rely on the terms of 
the contract rather than trade usages. 
 In a more subtle way, some authors  77  suggest that arbitrators may and 
should view sources of law in a less hierarchical way. This means arbitrators 
should not be constrained by the approach of most legal systems that 
recognise a strict hierarchy of sources of law, in which higher sources take 
precedence over lower sources. They argue that the interpretation of the 
phrase “to take into account” is consistent with their position. This phrase 
does not mean an obligation to apply the usages but merely requires taking 
them into consideration. In other words, it grants arbitrators discretion 
and fl exibility in the interplay between rules of law and usages in order to 
provide a just outcome considering the circumstances of each case.  78  
 On the other end of the spectrum, some scholars  79  maintain that trade 
usages shall not be given any privileged status in arbitration settings. They 
disagree with the argument raised above suggesting that the parties’ intention 
from referring to institutional rules is to incorporate trade usages into their 
contract. Their counterargument is that such a reference is a procedural 
choice and certainly not a choice to imply or supplement additional substantial 
terms into their contract. Therefore, they assert that trade usages shall be 
applied in accordance to the status conferred to them by the substantive law 
chosen by the parties to govern their contract, no more or less. This means 
 74   Ibid . 
 75   DiMatteo, [cited] above, fn 16; Lew, Mistelis and Kröll,  Comparative international commercial 
arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2003). 
 76   Webster and Buhler, [cited] above, fn 20. 
 77   DiMatteo, [cited] above, fn 16; Drahozal, [cited] above, fn 71. 
 78   Ibid . 
 79   Ayo lu, [cited] above, fn 72; Lew, Mistelis and Kröll [cited] above, fn 75. 
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that arbitrators shall determine the legal effect of trade usages pursuant to 
the hierarchy of sources as valid in the substantive law. 
 Even if arbitrators are not obliged to apply trade usages, Karton  80  
argues that they have preference to apply them. This preference refl ects 
the arbitrators’ belief or perception that trade usages are what the parties 
expect to govern their relationship. Karton proposes a theorem on the 
evolution of a commercial culture in international commercial arbitration 
as a result of an informal interaction between different social actors in the 
fi eld. The social actors involves the parties themselves and their “real” or 
“perceived” preferences and expectations, the decision makers themselves 
i.e. arbitrators, the arbitration institutions and their rules, and the states 
and their arbitration laws.  81  
 Diametrically opposed to Karton’s evolution theorem, Landolt  82  proposes 
another theorem on the evolution of international arbitration decision 
making. He argues that the genesis of international arbitration used to 
be in the informal application of the law by arbitrators acquainted with 
commerce but unschooled in law. In his analysis of the traces of the evolution 
of international commercial arbitration decision making, Landolt suggests 
that Article 17(2) of the 1998 ICC Rules is fossil evidence from that era. 
The article provides that “ [in all cases] the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account 
of the provisions of the contract and the relevant trade usages .” In line with the 
modern view of international commercial arbitration, the 2012 ICC Rules 
require in Article 21(2): “ the arbitral tribunal shall take account of the provisions 
of the contract, if any, between the parties and of any relevant trade usages ”. The 
actual practical effect of this change in the wording of ICC rules on the 
arbitrators’ decision making remains unknown. 
 Gluck  83  agrees with Landolt’s chronology. He suggests that during most 
of the 20th century, international arbitration was mainly concerned with 
the resolution of simple commercial or technical disputes by technocrats. 
The commercial parties understood how the dispute would be resolved 
and there was an implicit common understanding of the rules of the game 
between the disputants and the arbitrators. In the 21st century, arbitration 
has entered a new era. Today’s disputes often involve complex legal and 
factual controversies with hundreds of millions of dollars at stake. 
 In his evolution theorem, Landolt suggests that the evolution in the 
fi eld leads to “differentiation” between different species of international 
commercial arbitration. This differentiation is important because some 
divisions, such as commodities arbitrations, are still more concerned about 
the commercial practice and trade usages. Yet, in most other divisions, 
 80   Karton, [cited] above, fn 36. 
 81   Ibid . 
 82   Landolt, “Arbitrators’ Initiatives to Obtain Factual and Legal Evidence” (2012)  Arbitration 
International 28(2), 173 to 224. 
 83   Gluck, “Great Expectations: Meeting the Challenge of a New Arbitration Paradigm” (2012)  The 
American Review of International Arbitration 23(2), 231. 
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international commercial arbitration decision-making has evolved towards 
a position more favourable of the application of the law within the limits 
of the role of arbitrators.  84  The internal variations within international 
commercial arbitration fi elds make it a worthwhile exercise to examine 
the particularities of decision making in particular industries especially the 
construction industry that has the largest representation and the longest 
experience in commercial arbitration.  85  
 4. CONCLUSION 
 The extant literature provides an inconclusive answer to the basics of 
construction arbitration decision making. The “blurred picture” we have on 
how construction arbitrators make their decisions is a result of the dearth 
of published and accessible construction arbitration cases, the lack of 
consensus on the underlying value that should guide the arbitral decision 
making, and the shortage of empirical research on construction arbitration 
decision making. 
 Those empirical studies have hitherto merely scraped the surface and 
failed to develop an understanding of the realities of arbitral decision 
making at the grassroots level. The reductionist approach associated 
with the positivistic tradition (exemplifi ed by questionnaire surveys and 
experiments), which most empirical studies follow, offers a narrow and 
atomistic perspective and supplies mixed evidence on arbitral decision 
making. 
 This review reveals some of the salient features of arbitral decision 
making. It shows that some arbitrators may not follow or apply the law as 
judges would do, and even they might disregard it for the sake of their own 
version of fairness. It also demonstrates the tendency some arbitrators have 
to bring a commercial mindset to the reasoning process and to go beyond 
the four corners of the contract. 
 However, on balance and with due regard to the temporal and spatial 
variations to the arbitration setting, the available evidence suggests an 
increasing adherence to the law but, at the same time, a tendency to engage 
in commercial reasoning. Due to the positivistic nature of most empirical 
studies, it is diffi cult to determine the extent to which the commercial 
reasonableness infl uences decision making. Hence all inferences are 
tentative. 
 Therefore, to seek a plausible answer to international construction 
arbitration decision making, this review illustrates a need to move beyond 
prescriptive and normative theoretical accounts of construction arbitration 
 84   Landolt, [cited] above fn 82. 
 85   Blankenship, “Isomorphism of construction arbitration: The key to its prevention and reversal” 
(2010)  Dispute Resolution Journal 65(2/3), 114. 
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decision making. It also calls for a move from the positivistic paradigm to a 
deeper and more engaged interpretivistic form of scholarship to uncover 
the prisoned truth of how arbitrators actually decide disputes. We have 
been locked for a long time in Plato’s cave where the best we can do is to 
guess the standards of arbitral decision making from scattered scholastic 
texts and indirect evidence from the institutional structure of the fi eld. It is 
the time to get behind the closed doors of the private arbitration. 
